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Is Patriotism Immoral? 
Richard Arneson 
University of California at San Diego 
 
Many of us hold that it is morally required to favor one’s own 
nation and its people. We honor soldiers and firefighters who risk 
their lives for our country and our community. To some degree at 
least, even if not to the point of heroism, patriotism is a duty. In 
this way, our thinking on patriotism mirrors our thinking about 
other special ties: we don’t think it is optional for a parent to give 
priority to caring for her own child: from the moral standpoint, she 
must favor her own. The same goes for ties of personal friendship.  
The principle of patriotism (or nationalism) is not chauvinism. 
The principle affirms a universal duty that applies to everyone: 
Each person ought to favor her own country. We can distinguish 
two elements to this favoring. One is loyalty to an impersonal 
aim—the national project. One should promote the political 
autonomy of one’s own national community, which standardly 
takes the form of establishing and sustaining an independent nation 
state. Beyond bare political autonomy, the patriot also seeks the 
flourishing of her own nation and perhaps its competitive 
advancement over other nations. In addition to the national 
project, a second element in nationalism is favoring the 
advancement of the interests of one’s fellow countrymen. The 
patriot gives priority to promoting flourishing lives for co-
nationals. 
I say that many of us accept the principle of patriotism. But 
there is an opposed moral perspective: cosmopolitanism. The 
cosmopolitan regards herself as a citizen of the world and, roughly 
speaking, holds that national borders and membership in nation 
states (and similar social groups) lack intrinsic, noninstrumental 
moral significance. The cosmopolitan view is that people are 
people, and our common humanity is the ground of our moral 
duties toward people. Let’s call the moral position that denies that 
we have special moral duties to people in virtue of common 
national membership per se extreme cosmopolitanism. If extreme 
cosmopolitanism is right, the principle of patriotism is wrong. 
Which is right? 
Notice that whereas extreme cosmopolitanism and 
patriotism/nationalism as just specified oppose one another, there 
is a moderate version of cosmopolitanism that is fully compatible 
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with patriotism/nationalism. The moderate cosmopolitan holds (a) that 
we have significant moral duties to other people that obtain just in 
virtue of their humanity and (b) that we also have significant moral 
duties to other people in virtue of the special tie relationship arising 
from our being fellow countrymen. Some think there is really no 
issue about cosmopolitanism worth discussing because moderate 
cosmopolitanism is obviously true and extreme cosmopolitanism 
is obviously false.1 Of course we have some duties to help needy 
strangers in distant lands. Of course we have special duties to favor 
those near and dear to us, and among these duties, some surely 
include duties to fellow countrymen. If these claims are true, then 
extreme cosmopolitanism is obviously false. 
In this essay I want to do some uphill sledding. I want to defend 
extreme cosmopolitanism. My defense is provisional. I shall try to 
rebut some plausible sounding arguments that have been offered 
in defense of national partiality.   
Extreme cosmopolitanism can be contrasted with a more 
radical view, very extreme cosmopolitanism. This more extreme 
cosmopolitan holds (a) that we are bound by some moral duties to 
other people just in virtue of their humanity and (b) that we are 
bound by no moral duties to others except those that obtain just in 
virtue of their humanity. The extreme cosmopolitan opposes 
patriotic partiality but allows that partiality to friends and close 
family members might be justified; the very extreme cosmopolitan 
1 See Samuel Scheffler, “Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism,” 
reprinted in his Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and 
Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 111-130. Scheffler comments, “Whereas 
the moderate versions of cosmopolitanism may strike some people 
as being so obvious as to be vacuous or platitudinous, the extreme 
versions may seem so implausible as to be difficult to take 
seriously.” He does not endorse the claim that what seems so here 
really is so, but he offers no reason to reject it. He suggests that 
failure to distinguish the moderate and extreme versions of 
cosmopolitanism night explain the otherwise puzzling fact that 
some people embrace the extreme version despite the absence of 
reasons that favor it. Perhaps these people see that some version 
of cosmopolitanism is very plausible and wrongly suppose the only 
version available is the extreme version, so make the mistake of 
concluding that the extreme version is very plausible.  
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rejects partiality across the board. Some of what I say supporting 
extreme cosmopolitanism also supports the more extreme version 
of the doctrine. 
In this essay the cosmopolitanism I defend is the extreme 
variety, so from now on I sometimes refer to the position this essay 
affirms simply as cosmopolitanism. (On this usage, the “moderate 
cosmopolitan” is a defender of nationalism and patriotism and so 
not really cosmopolitan. My usage here is just a stylistic choice; 
nothing substantive hangs on it.) 
Special tie duties to others that hold in virtue of our standing 
in some particular relationship to them might be regarded as 
morally significant for their own sake or derivatively as means to 
furthering other moral goals that do matter noninstrumentally. 
Take the example of patriotism. If people living in proximity to one 
another on some territory have patriotic sentiments, that may 
facilitate their cooperating together successfully in ways that fulfill 
independent moral duties they have such as establishing public 
safety and the rule of law across the territory. Insofar as this is so, 
the extreme cosmopolitan has no objection to patriotism. Nor does 
the cosmopolitan object to training people to see themselves as 
having duties to conationals that function as means to furthering 
their fundamental moral duties, the ones that matter 
noninstrumentally. The moral issue arises when it is claimed that 
we have significant duties to fellow countrymen that we should 
fulfill even at cost to fulfilling fundamental moral duties and 
advancing fundamental moral values. For example, if we have 
moral duties to promote justice and help the needy, the patriotic 
principle holds that we ought to give priority to promoting justice 
for our nation even if that will lead to lesser fulfillment of justice in 
the world overall, and that we ought to give priority to helping 
needy fellow countrymen even if there are needier people 
elsewhere who would benefit more from the assistance we could 
give them than our fellow countrymen would benefit. 
In these examples the appeal of cosmopolitanism is 
transparent. Injustice is injustice, no matter who suffers it. All else 
being equal, it seems wrong to be more concerned about justice 
when what is at stake affects those who share my skin color or 
ethnicity. Why should national origin or national community 
matter more than these morally arbitrary factors? You can say that 
the patriot does not see injustice as less morally wrong depending 
on who suffers it, but she holds that from her perspective, 
correcting injustice is (and ought to be) a greater concern for her 
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when conationals are involved. But why think that? After all, a 
morally sophisticated racist does not hold that her race has special 
merit or worth, but rather that it is morally important for members 
of each race to stand by their own and give priority to advancing 
the interests of their group even at cost to others. This morally 
sophisticated racism is still racism and still morally offensive. The 
extreme cosmopolitan holds that a morally sophisticated patriotism 
understood in a parallel way is also morally offensive. Thinking this 
is fully compatible with appreciating that human nature includes 
psychological dispositions to favor our own, and this disposition 
tends to generate special concern for those we identify as “us” as 
opposed to “them” along various dimensions including nationality. 
If this claim about human psychological tendencies is true, the 
cosmopolitan accepts these empirical facts. She just does not 
accord them moral standing. 
Patriotism, like other special ties, may take the form of 
amplifying or dampening other moral considerations. That is to 
say, one may hold that whatever moral reasons there are for helping 
others and refraining from harming others in certain ways that 
violate their rights, these reasons are amplified if the person you 
might help or harm by your action or omission is a conational. On 
this view, murder is wrong, but murder of an American is especially 
wrong, if I am an American. Extreme cosmopolitanism rejects any 
such moral arithmetic. At the fundamental moral level, persons are 
persons, and each one counts the same and has the same 
fundamental moral entitlements, says the extreme cosmopolitan. 
There are other puzzles about patriotism and partiality apart 
from the conflict with cosmopolitanism. One puzzle arises when 
we notice that those of us who favor partiality tend to be selective 
about what forms of partiality to embrace. So the account of 
partiality one accepts should be able to explain why we should 
accept some types of partiality and reject others. People form 
special attachments and develop special loyalty to their friends, 
close family members, fellow community members, and fellow 
countrymen. People also form special attachments and develop 
special loyalty to men as opposed to women, to members of their 
ethnic group as contrasted with outsiders, to members of the race 
to which they take themselves to belong, perhaps on the basis of 
skin color or other physical appearance similarities. So we might 
hope that an acceptable account of special tie duties will explain 
why some types of partiality such as partiality to our children and 
maybe partiality to conationals is morally acceptable and partiality 
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to people who like us have white (or brown, or black, and so on) 
skin color is not morally acceptable. 
In what follows I consider and reject several positive accounts 
that purport to justify the claim that we have special duties to fellow 
countrymen. If any of these accounts is correct, extreme 
cosmopolitanism must be false. I try to show that none of these 
accounts on offer is correct. This does not amount to a conclusive 
argument in favor of extreme cosmopolitanism. Even if so far 
nobody has a good argument against extreme cosmopolitanism, 
showing this is so would leave it an open possibility that tomorrow 
someone will find a better argument. Anyway, even if we cannot 
find good arguments against extreme cosmopolitanism, maybe the 
thing to do is to suspend judgment. My hope is at least to plant a 
seed of doubt. Maybe the underlying reason why we are having 
trouble finding arguments for the truth of our commonsense 
beliefs about the moral acceptability of patriotism is that those 
beliefs are in fact false. 
I make one further point in an effort to show that extreme 
cosmopolitanism despite initial appearances is quite credible. I try 
to show that we should anyway distinguish levels of moral 
reasoning. For example, we should distinguish what is morally right 
at the level of fundamental principle from the different question, 
what the laws ought to allow and prohibit. There might be good 
reasons to have a legal code that prohibits engaging in a type of 
activity even if in some circumstances, from the perspective of 
fundamental moral principles, we should see that engaging in that 
activity here and now is actually morally right. In the same way, we 
should realize that we have need for further distinct levels of moral 
thinking including a level of social norms and even a level of public 
morality (what we should proclaim as moral rules to be obeyed in 
public life, for example, official political pronouncements).  
Something can be against the social norms we ought to have 
established and against the public morality we should proclaim yet 
right as assessed from the perspective of fundamental moral 
principle.  For example, maybe the public morality we ought to 
have should declare roundly that killing the innocent in war is 
wrongful terrorism even though we should recognize that in some 
circumstances killing the innocent might be the morally right 
course of action for some individual. In a similar way, we might 
well have reason to endorse and approve some forms of patriotism 
at the level of social norm or public morality even though as a 
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matter of fact, seen from the perspective of fundamental moral 
principles, patriotism is morally wrong.2  
1. National partiality and partiality of 
parents toward children. 
To clarify the opposition between cosmopolitanism and 
nationalism, consider how the claim that people ought to be loyal 
to their nation and partial to fellow countrymen differs from 
another possible basis of special tie partiality, that of parents 
toward children. Many of us hold that parents have special 
obligations to care for their own children. This special duty can 
require a parent to give priority to feeding his own child even 
though a child down the street or in a distant land is hungrier and 
needs food more. So far, this duty sounds like the claimed duty of 
conationals to favor their own. But there is a difference. In the case 
of the parent-child relationship, in the standard case the biological 
parent has brought it about by a voluntary act that there exists a 
particular young child that is vulnerable and needs continuous adult 
nurturance for many years. (In the case of an adoptive parent, the 
voluntary act giving rise to parental duties may take a different 
form.) The principle here is that if one is directly responsible for 
2 The view bluntly stated in the text might seem sleazy and corrupt 
and obviously wrong. How could it be acceptable for public 
officials to declare that X is morally right when X in fact is morally 
wrong? Consider a simple example. We teach morality to children 
in absolutist terms. We say, “Telling a lie is wrong. You should not 
tell lies.” In fact, the morality of deception has to be more 
complicated and nuanced than this, as we recognize. Sometimes 
the consequences of not telling a particular lie would be so bad that 
any sensible person will agree that in this situation one should tell 
a lie. For somewhat similar reasons, the morality of do’s and don’ts 
that we proclaim in public political contexts, announce from the 
court house steps as it were, should probably also be stated in 
simper terms than would be reflected in the formulation of a set of 
moral principles we would be prepared to affirm as adequate for all 
cases. If there is good moral reason for having layers to morality, 
moving from layer to layer is not hypocrisy, or anyway need not be 
that.  
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bringing about the existence of a child, one has a duty to care for 
it or ensure that it receives proper parental care.  
A cosmopolitan morality can accept the ideas that, for example, 
parents (and guardians who have taken on the parent role) have 
obligations to give priority to give priority to caring for their own 
children and hence duties to be partial toward their own children. 
Lockean libertarianism would be an example of a cosmopolitan 
morality that accepts parental partiality. The Lockean libertarian 
holds that each person has the moral right to live as she chooses 
provided she does not wrongfully harm others in certain ways (that 
qualify as violations of their moral rights) and the moral right not 
to be harmed by others in these certain ways.3 The Lockean 
libertarian denies that simply in virtue of being born into a 
particular national group or community, or simply in virtue of 
standing in certain relations to others that amount to nationhood, 
one thereby has special moral duties of partiality toward national 
community members of the kind the nationalist affirms.  
Other cosmopolitan moralities, in the act consequentialist 
family, deny that there are special moral duties of partiality that the 
nationalist or patriot affirms, and take this position in the course of 
embracing a more sweeping rejection of special tie agent-relative 
duties regarded as having a place at the level of fundamental moral 
principles. But cosmopolitanism is a big tent, encompassing any 
doctrine that rejects many forms of partiality including national 
partiality at the level of fundamental moral principle even if it 
accepts some forms of partiality including partiality of friends to 
friends and parents to children and perhaps close family members 
to close family members. The cosmopolitan rejects agent-relative 
moral duties prescribing that people be partial to their conationals 
and to the national cause, but need not reject agent-relative moral 
duties across the board. For the cosmopolitan, each candidate 
moral partiality must have a moral grounding that establishes its 
fundamental moral status and national partiality fails to qualify. To 
see whether this is plausible, we need to examine claimed moral 
groundings for patriotism or national partiality. 
3 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic 
Books, 1974. On Locke’s views, see John Locke, Second Treatise of 
Government, C. B. Macpherson, ed., (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishers, 1980). (Originally published 1690.) 
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2. National partiality resembles friendship partiality. 
The claim reviewed in this section is that partiality toward friends 
and close family members is justified, and the same reasons that 
support these uncontroversial forms of partiality also support 
national partiality, so national partiality is justified. Thomas Hurka 
makes an appealing case for the partiality to fellow countrymen 
element in patriotism.4 (He sets aside the national project element 
in national partiality.) His strategy starts with the plausible 
assumption that partiality to friends and close family members is 
justified, and proceeds to identify the partiality-grounding features 
of these special tie relationships, and then look to see to what 
extent the special tie of shared national membership has these 
features.5 Take friendship.  
Hurka proposes that there are two prerequisites for friendship 
partiality. One is that there is some objective basis for liking one’s 
friend; one must perceive that the friend has some genuinely good 
(not necessarily superlative) traits. That such an objective basis is 
needed becomes clear if we notice that sheer subjective positive 
feeling does not suffice to justify partiality—a racist may have 
strong subjective affection for white people and strong animosity 
to black and brown people. The second prerequisite for justified 
friendship partiality is having a shared personal history of the right 
sort. This shared history connects one’s friendship attitudes to 
particular persons. According to Hurka a shared personal history 
“of the right sort” is a history either of doing good together or of 
suffering evil together or both.  
Hurka thinks his account has the attractive feature of 
supporting our intuitive conviction that some relationships are 
appropriate friendship bases and some are not. A shared history of 
4 Thomas Hurka, “The Justification of National Partiality, “ in 
Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, eds., The Morality of Nationalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 139-157. 
5 His account seems to presuppose that there is one set of 
conditions that justifies partiality of any type. So if we can isolate 
the correct conditions for friendship partiality, we can tell if 
national partiality is justified by seeing if national community 
solidarity satisfies the friendship partiality conditions. An 
alternative view would be that there are different types of special 
tie relationship, and what justifies special tie partiality varies across 
the different types of special tie relationship. 
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raising children together and suffering adversity together is an 
appropriate basis for my friendship with Sheila, but a shared history 
of having been Nazi concentration camp guards together or of 
oppressing black people together is not an appropriate basis for 
friendship or any special affiliation.  
Regarding national partiality, Hurka’s proposed prerequisites 
for partiality yield a mixed but positive assessment. Nations can 
have good traits (for example, Canada produces good hockey 
players), so this prerequisite for justified partiality can be fully 
satisfied. Regarding having a shared history of the right sort, the 
verdict is mixed. Friends and close family members share intimate 
sustained personal relations; nothing like this is true of my 
relationship to my fellow Americans. I’m not even acquainted with 
the vast bulk of them. But fellow countrymen can share a 
significant history of doing good and enjoying good together and 
also of suffering evil together, so on this score, the relationship of 
being fellow countrymen can fully qualify. Overall it seems the 
prerequisites for partiality are present in some national 
membership relationships, but not as fully as they are in successful 
friendship and close family relations.  
In reply: Hurka’s account does not separate intuitively justified 
forms of partiality from intuitively unjustified forms as he 
supposes. So something is awry. His proposal does not perform as 
advertised. Consider unregenerate male chauvinism, the raw 
favoring of men’s interests over those of women. Suppose I hold 
that men share the valuable trait of having distinctive reproductive 
organs. The claim need not be that men’s special traits are more 
valuable than women’s special traits, just that the former are 
valuable. Now consider that men throughout history have a long 
distinguished record of contributing toward reproduction in the 
way that only men can (contributing sperm to the process). This is 
a long history of doing good together, and according to Hurka a 
shared history of doing good together combined with recognition 
of objectively valuable traits constitutes an appropriate basis for 
special affiliation, and on this basis he offers a mild endorsement 
of national partiality. But as just indicated, men affiliating with men 
and having specially friendly feelings to each other on the basis of 
their sharing a history of doing good together satisfy the conditions 
for justified partiality in the same way that national partiality does. 
If we reject unregenerate male chauvinism, as we should, we should 
reject Hurka’s account. 
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Further reply: Hurka’s account of friendship is anyway 
questionable. One feature of his account is that it holds that 
friendship must be based on mutual perception by the friends of 
valuable traits in each other. I deny there are such eligibility 
conditions for friendship. If you are a person, you are apt for 
friendship. Friendship will have triggering causes; one will be 
attracted to something in the friend; but one needs no reasons or 
justifications for forming a friendship with a particular person.  
It is also questionable whether having a shared history of a 
particular sort is necessary for good friendship. First, it might be 
that a shared history of doing evil together yokes people together. 
Having been a concentration camp guard with Fred might be the 
basis of perfectly acceptable friendship with Fred. One should 
regret the evildoing and not gloat in the memories, but that does 
not gainsay the point. Second, it is anyway doubtful that any shared 
history is necessary for good friendship. Tom and Sally might be 
attracted to one another and like, even love each other, but have 
no opportunity for shared history together. Love at first sight, and 
friendship at first sight, are conceptually possible. Or Tom and 
Sally might realize that interacting with each other would be a bad 
thing, so they refrain from ever interacting. They might refrain 
from interacting because they are friends. A history of personal 
interaction is something that friends standardly seek and value, but 
this typical feature of friendship need not be regarded as a 
necessary condition for friendship or for good friendship.  
Here is a spare account of friendship that takes these points on 
board: For A and B to be friends, it must be the case that based on 
acquaintance (1) A has liking or positive affection for B, (2) A is 
disposed especially to seek B’s good on appropriate occasions, and 
(3) condition 2 is true because condition 1 is true (A is disposed 
specially to bring about B’s good because A likes B), and (4) the 
situation is reciprocal; B likes A and is disposed to bring about A’s 
good for this reason. In a good friendship, friends act for one 
another’s good on appropriate occasions, and they care about one 
another a lot, and having once initiated friendship, they do not 
cease to have the complex of attitudes that constitutes their 
friendship. A good friendship endures. 
The spare account of friendship has the plausible implication 
that national partiality is ruled out as an instance of friendship on a 
large scale. The members of a nation state lack personal 
acquaintance with one another, so they will not satisfy the 
conditions of friendship specified in the spare account. If satisfying 
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these conditions renders partiality appropriate, if anything does, 
then the spare account of friendship does not assert conditions for 
justified partiality that national solidarity or nationalism can fulfill. 
Objection: the spare account of friendship does not rule out 
racist solidarity as impermissible or in any way an inadequate basis 
for friendship. One might be disposed to like anyone with white 
skin and disposed specially to seek the good of anyone with white 
skin one encounters and then likes. If there are no eligibility 
conditions for friendship partiality, racial solidarity qualifies as 
acceptable—but this is clearly wrong. 
Reply to objection: One does not have personal acquaintance with 
all people of some skin color, so one cannot have liking for all 
people of a favored skin color based on acquaintance, so the spare 
account conditions cannot be met. But perhaps one can be 
disposed to like any white-skinned person one meets, and the 
individual likings of white-skinned individuals one meets might 
seem immune from criticism on the spare account, which sounds 
wrong.  One might annotate the spare account as follows: although 
there are no eligibility conditions for friendship, and one can be led 
to friendship attitudes toward an individual by any features she has, 
perhaps there should be an exception for immoral attitudes 
grounding friendship. If one hates black-skinned people and on 
this basis likes white-skinned people, this tainted origin vitiates 
(what would otherwise be) friendship. 
Further reply to objection: Perhaps the problem just described 
indicates not that there is anything wrong with the spare account 
of friendship but that the assumption that friendship is a special tie 
that grounds partiality on a noninstrumental basis is flawed. The 
crucial moral difference between partiality toward friends and close 
family members on the one hand and partiality toward fellow 
members of a supposed race or skin color similarity grouping on 
the other hand is that the former type of relationship but not the 
latter tends to promote good consequences, good outcomes for 
people’s lives. 
3. Partiality as partially constitutive 
of special-tie relationships. 
Maybe looking for some special feature that justifies partiality in 
friendship and other special tie relationships is just misguided. It 
might be true that our ideals of certain social relationships have 
norms of partiality built into them. What is noninstrumentally 
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valuable in relations such as friendship and love includes partiality. 
As has been said, “It is part of the meaning or significance of these 
relations that they legitimize certain forms of partiality. A relation 
that did not, given opportunities, call forth and require partial 
behavior on at least some occasions would not be love at all.”6 
Much the same might be said about friendship. And maybe 
members of a national community, having mild affection or caring 
and concern for one another, automatically are committed to 
partiality toward one another.  
Perhaps this idea can be generalized. The idea here would be 
that if you value noninstrumentally a social relationship that you 
have, you are already committed to accepting that your partners in 
that social relationship have special claims on you, beyond what 
anyone could claim of you just in virtue of your common humanity 
or personhood. Valuing a social relationship you have includes 
accepting some duties of partiality, the particular character of the 
duties perhaps varying with the type of relationship that is in 
question. There is simply no logical room to value, for example, 
your friendship with a person for its own sake, not just as a possible 
means to some goals you might have, and yet to reject all claims to 
partiality that are part and parcel of friendship.7 
If the general claim is true, then the extreme cosmopolitan is in 
a bind. If she rejects all claims of partiality as a matter of principle, 
she then cannot noninstrumentally value any of her social 
relationships such as friendship without lapsing into inconsistency. 
If acceptance of duties of partiality that are conceptually tied to a 
type of relationship is part of what it means to engage in a 
relationship of that type, then the extreme cosmopolitan cannot 
fully enter into any social relationship. If extreme cosmopolitanism 
carries that commitment, the doctrine is surely unacceptable. 
Even if the general claim is not true, it might still be the case 
that particular important kinds of social relationships, such as 
friendship, love, parent child special ties, close family ties, and 
patriotism, are partly constituted by acceptance of some duties of 
partiality among participants. Rejecting those social relationships 
6 Jeff McMahan, “The Limits of National Partiality,” in The Morality 
of Nationalism, 107-138, at 118. 
7 Samuel Scheffler presses the line of thought rehearsed in this 
paragraph in his “Relationships and Responsibilities,” in his 
Boundaries and Allegiances. 
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on the basis of a controversial version of cosmopolitan moral 
principle would be unreasonable, to put it mildly. 
My response in support of the reasonableness of the extreme 
cosmopolitan doctrine will not be surprising. I shall claim that in a 
sense the extreme cosmopolitan can accept the partiality that is 
built into our concepts of certain social relationships, and this 
qualified acceptance is acceptance enough. 
The spare account of friendship that I would defend builds a 
disposition of partiality into friendship. Being a friend of someone, 
one is disposed specially to bring about that person’s good. This 
means one is disposed to some extent to sacrifice one’s own good 
to advance the good of one’s friend and also that one is disposed 
to some extent to favor advancing the good of one’s friend over 
advancing the good of other people. This feature of friendship 
might seem to put it immediately in conflict with very extreme 
cosmopolitanism, but the appearances here are deceiving. 
Cosmopolitanism is a claim about the morally right, about what 
one morally ought to do and has a moral duty to do. The norm of 
partiality that is internal to friendship as so far described is a claim 
about the good, not a claim about the morally right. Social norms 
are part of the idea of friendship. A friend is partial to her friends, 
and a good friend is fiercely loyal to her friends. Another norm 
internal to friendship is constancy: a good friend is loyal to her 
friends in the further sense that she sustains friendship with them. 
Once friendship is begun, it is desirable that it lasts. These claims 
about the nature of the good of friendship are fully compatible with 
even severely cosmopolitan moral doctrines. What is good is one 
thing; what is morally right is another. 
To explain, we need to consider some version of 
cosmopolitanism that fills in some account of what we morally owe 
to each other. The version of cosmopolitanism to be defended here 
is a member of the act consequentialist family of views: one morally 
ought always to do whatever would bring about the best outcome, 
and outcomes are to be assessed according to the good or bad 
quality of the lives that people lead in them, along with the fairness 
of the distribution of good and bad across persons. The good is 
good lives for people, fairly distributed. 
It’s plausible to hold that forming and sustaining friendship in 
itself makes the lives of the friends better. (If two persons’ lives 
were exactly the same in relevant respects, except that one 
maintained a friendship, the life of the person with the friendship 
would be the better of the two lives.)  Forming a friendship 
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includes becoming disposed to favor one’s friend. The acts of 
forming and sustaining friendship can be morally right acts by 
cosmopolitan act consequentialist standards, even though such acts 
involve rendering it likely or even certain that in the future one will 
sometimes act to favor one’s friend in circumstances where doing 
that is morally wrong by act consequentialist standards. If 
friendship is a great good, a world with more friendships in it can 
be better than a world with fewer friendships even if in the second 
world fewer morally wrong acts are done. In the way just described, 
even the very extreme cosmopolitan can embrace friendship as a 
good, even given that internal to friendship is a norm that says 
friends should favor their friends. The position is consistent 
because the favoring norm generates a duty from the standpoint of 
the good, not one from the standpoint of moral right. (In much the 
same way one can accept that in American-style football the 
fullback has a duty to protect the quarterback by blocking incoming 
defensive players and to run the football in short yardage situations 
without taking these role assignments to be moral duties.) If one 
neglects the distinctions just noted, one may affirm that if friends 
have duties to favor their friends (and parents have duties to favor 
their children, and so on for other special tie responsibilities), then 
act consequentialist cosmopolitanism must be false. That is 
incorrect. 
A good friend is disposed to act for the good of the friend. The 
good friend ought to be so disposed. There’s a duty here, not a 
moral duty but a social norm duty. This becomes clear when we 
consider that the duties of friendship can be flatly opposed to 
uncontroversial moral demands. As the saying goes, a friend will 
help you move; a good friend will help you move a body. If 
friendship norms were moral principles, then there would be 
conflict between the moral requirement to be a good friend and 
any set of moral principles that yields the firm judgment that one 
morally must not be complicit in murder. But there is no such 
conflict of moral principle. Of course, social norms can tug at our 
loyalties, and being a good friend may well motivate one to do some 
things forbidden by morality for the sake of the friend or for the 
sake of the friendship. But lots of attitudes and desires and personal 
commitments can pull against moral requirements; that does not 
indicate any conflict within moral theory that requires a balancing 
of opposed principles.    
Even if friendship did necessarily involve being morally bound 
to be partial to one’s friend, it is a stretch to consider one’s relations 
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to one’s fellow countrymen a friendship relationship.  But the 
account just given shows that anyway friendship, though plausibly 
involving a duty to be partial, does not involve a moral duty to be 
partial, so even if we should regard ourselves as having friendship 
of a weak sort with all fellow countrymen, that concession would 
not commit us to holding that we are morally bound in any way to 
be partial to fellow countrymen. 
The defense of extreme cosmopolitanism offered in this 
section is pretty weak tea, the reader may be thinking. I agree. All I 
have done is show that one objection to extreme cosmopolitanism 
that would be devastating if it were well-supported is in fact 
weightless, and gives no reason at all to reject the extreme 
cosmopolitan position. Or at least, there is an independently 
plausible moral doctrine, act consequentialism, that can be coupled 
with extreme cosmopolitanism and when so joined offers no 
traction for the objection being considered. This does not amount 
to any sort of positive reason to embrace extreme 
cosmopolitanism. 
4. Nationalism, the nation-state, and partiality: 
four proposals. 
Perhaps national partiality is justified in a way that is quite different 
from anything considered to this point. The lines of thought to be 
considered under this heading do not rely on the idea that there is 
an analogy between friendship and love of country or that the latter 
resembles the former, such that we have duties of partiality just as 
we have duties of friendship. The thought is rather that, in some 
way or another, the relationship of individuals to the state is crucial 
for the justification of duties of national partiality. We live under a 
particular state, along with others, and acquire special duties to 
fellow citizens, who share membership in that state. Something or 
other about specifically political social relationships grounds duties 
of patriotism.   
A clue here is that on many people’s views, national partiality 
becomes a moral requirement only in certain contexts. Suppose 
you are hiking in the desert and you learn somehow that someone 
nearby is lost and in grave danger of perishing from exposure and 
thirst. You may feel some pressure of moral duty to aid the person 
in need even at considerable cost and risk. To decide what to do, 
whether to mount a rescue operation or not, one does not need to 
know the nationality of the lost hiker. One does not have less 
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reason to help if you are a U.S. citizen and the person in peril is 
not. Someone who considers herself a patriot might not feel that 
this is the sort of situation that should trigger patriotic dispositions. 
In contrast, if one were voting for U.S. government policy, one 
might feel a patriotic duty to make sure that the government 
adequately protects Americans from natural disasters, and that this 
duty of government takes priority over any duties it might have to 
aid distant needy strangers from other lands. 
4.1. The nation-state, coercion, and autonomy. 
The philosopher Michael Blake suggests how this might be so.8 
Blake holds that the state massively coerces those inside state 
boundaries but not outsiders, though there is coercive border 
control. (Take coercion to be issuance of commands backed by 
threat of serious penalties sufficient to induce compliance.) The 
coercion is a presumptive violation of autonomy, which requires 
justification. The state enforces contract, tort, criminal, and 
property laws that benefit some at the expense of others, so an 
issue of comparative fairness is raised, which triggers egalitarian (or 
at any rate heightened) justice requirements.  Benefiting from and 
supporting the particular forms that state coercion takes, one 
comes to have a special burden of justifying these coercive 
arrangements to those who are comparatively disadvantaged by 
them, and this burden of justification can be discharged only when 
the state one supports gives special priority to acting for the 
advantage of all who suffer this coercion and especially those 
whom the scheme of coercion helps least. 
In this way Mexicans come to have special duties to fellow 
Mexican citizens, Nigerians to Nigerians, and so on. Members of 
each separate nation are tied together in a web of coercion affecting 
them and not others. Each of us is implicated in the particular web 
of coercion in which we are enmeshed, and our relation to this 
coercion generates distributive justice duties that apply to the 
members of each distinct nation and not across national 
boundaries. National borders in this way coincide with morally 
significant features that generate special agent-relative duties owed 
by and to insiders and not outsiders.  
8 Michael Blake, “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and 
Autonomy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (2001), 257-296. 
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Response: The argument just sketched overstates and also 
misdescribes the moral significance of coercion. Grant that when 
coercion is imposed, a justification is owed to those coerced. (It is 
also true that when coercion is not imposed, and some are affected 
negatively by absence of coercion, a justification is owed to those 
negatively affected for the omission of the establishment of a 
coercive web.) The justification of coercion need not appeal to 
benefit to the coerced person. The coercion may be constraining 
individuals from doing what they are anyway morally bound not to 
do regardless of whether a coercive apparatus is in place. Coercion 
can be a great evil when people are forced not to do what they have 
a perfect right to do or forced to do what they have a perfect right 
to refrain from doing, but these are not the only cases.  
The autonomy (on any plausible construal) denied by coercion 
may not be morally important. The laws against homicide sit lightly 
on my autonomy if I have no will to murder anyone and would not 
be motivated to commit murder even if there were no coercive 
criminal justice apparatus set to impose severe penalties on me if I 
did perpetrate this crime. The laws against homicide do have an 
impact on my decision making and do crimp my autonomy 
significantly if I do harbor serious murderous will, but in this 
unfortunate circumstance, my loss of autonomy is morally 
weightless. For many instances of state coercion, either the 
coercive law should not be in place (the person has a moral right 
to do what the laws forbid) or an adequate justification of the 
enforcement of the coercive law by the state is that the persons 
coerced are independently bound not to perpetrate the prohibited 
acts.  
Perhaps for some types of coercion A may coerce B only on 
the condition that the coercion benefits B adequately.  But why 
think state enforcement of moral requirements is necessarily such 
a case? A may coerce B, the worst off person in society, in order to 
provide aid to outsiders in fulfillment of moral duties that A and B 
owe to C. The Blake stipulations just raise the question, what 
justifies state coercion, and offer no considerations that support 
the answer that partiality toward the coerced must be part of the 
justification. 
Blake raises a further point regarding situations in which we all 
benefit from having a coercive scheme that coordinates our 
behavior but there are several possible schemes that might be put 
in place and the particular scheme imposed benefits me at your 
expense. If I benefit from such a scheme and support its 
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maintenance, do I not owe you a justification for imposing this 
arrangement on you? Again, I grant that a justification is owed, but 
I deny that the justification must cite reasons that show the 
coercion is of benefit, or even maximal benefit, to those who are 
left worst off under the scheme. The coercive scheme might reward 
the deserving and be justifiable on that ground, or might boost 
overall well-being and distribute the benefits in some way that is 
fair, even if not equally or in a way that is maximally favorable to 
the worst off. Again, the coercive scheme might be justifiable in 
virtue of its effective fulfillment of duties of beneficence owed to 
outsiders such as distant needy strangers. The justification of the 
scheme to the worst off insider who is affected might be that this 
scheme, compared to others that might instead be installed, is 
especially favorable to worst off outsiders, who are far worse off 
than any insiders, members of the political society in question.  
Again, that a justification for imposition of a coercive scheme is 
needed does not imply that the justification must refer 
predominantly to the interests of members of the political society 
rather than outsiders. We are not in the vicinity of a justification of 
partiality to conationals as a requirement of justice. 
4.2. Working together to promote the national project.   
A variant of the proposal under review drops the idea that state 
coercion of state residents is crucial for justified national partiality. 
The crucial point rather is that under favorable circumstances 
members of a national community are working together to 
promote a morally worthy project—the building and preservation 
of an independent nation with just institutions. Working together 
with others to promote a worthy goal, one acquires duties specially 
to have care and concern for one’s fellow participants in this 
project. 
Reply: It is doubtful that all members of nation states do or 
should adopt the special project of building an independent, just 
state. People might instead work for justice elsewhere, in other 
lands. One might discharge whatever obligation one has to work 
for justice by acting for distant strangers and form community with 
them. Moreover, even if one does work for justice in one’s own 
land, it is unclear why doing so should trigger special duties to favor 
fellow conationals (some of whom are not working for justice 
anyway).  In general, working on a project with a person does not 
trigger a duty specially to promote that person’s good, so it is not 
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clear why working on the national project should trigger any such 
duty.  
4.3. The state coerces us and claims to act in our name. 
Thomas Nagel and Ronald Dworkin independently suggest that 
the state massively coerces insiders but not outsiders and 
unavoidably claims to act in the name of the governed, those 
required to comply with the laws.9 The combination of factors 
triggers special egalitarian requirements that apply only in each 
country taken separately and hence oppose extreme cosmopolitan 
impartiality. The relation of the state to each state inhabitant 
includes a special involvement of the will and the justification of 
this requires egalitarian justice. 
Response: One might hold that the special involvement of the 
will that Nagel associates with imposition of government coercion 
is in fact a ubiquitous accompaniment of any act or omission that 
affects others or might do so. If your act affects others or might do 
so, you owe them a justification. Implicitly in the sheer fact that 
one is acting, there is a non-disavowable claim being made by the 
actor that what she is doing can be justified to others. There is, so 
to speak, a universal second-person demand triggered by action: 
Each person who is or might be affected has a claim that you justify 
to her what you are doing.10 The commitment implicit in action is 
that one is able to show that one’s action is justifiable according to 
principles we all can share. What one does is permissible, one 
claims, and all should agree that in one’s shoes, they would rightly 
claim to be justified to do the same. 
Nagel clearly intends something stronger than the involvement 
of the will just described. But insofar as this is so, the something 
9 Thomas Nagel, “The Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 33 (2005), 257-296; also Ronald Dworkin, Law’s 
Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, chapter 6, and 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 
(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 
“Introduction: Does Equality Matter?”, 1-7. 
10 I would say the same claim can be asserted by a mere bystander, 
in the name of anyone who is or might be affected by what one 
does. Being the person affected is not required for moral standing 
to complain about what one does or omits. 
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stronger is disputable.  “We are all participants in the general will.” 
If this means that each who is coerced can agree that her interests 
are being advanced equally along with everyone else’s, that is not 
an acceptable moral requirement to place on action and not an 
acceptable constraint to place on the special class of coercive 
actions. If this means that each person being coerced, if she were 
well informed and fully rational and thinking clearly, would agree 
that the coercive law under consideration equally serves the 
common good of all coerced, that again is too strong a 
requirement. (The law might benefit distant needy strangers not 
any of the coerced.) 
4.4. Members of nation-states cooperate with each other to 
provide essential public goods.  
Andrea Sangiovanni holds that when people cooperate together in 
ways necessary to provide basic public goods that make it possible 
to adopt and pursue a plan of life, duties of reciprocity arise that 
take the form of special justice requirements owed to fellow 
cooperators. These special justice requirements in effect dictate 
partiality toward conationals, because as a matter of fact, these 
cooperative schemes involve members of each state cooperating 
with other members of that same state, not with outsiders. So it 
emerges that special justice norms apply among the members of 
each separate state and do not apply across states.11 
Sangiovanni seeks to justify national partiality by showing that 
fellow citizens cooperate together in ways that give rise to special 
duties according to the Hart-Rawls principle of fairness, which 
holds that “when a number of persons engage in a just, mutually 
advantageous cooperative venture according to rules an thus 
restrain their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, 
those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to 
similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from 
their submission.” 12  
Response: The boundaries of important cooperative networks 
supplying important public (excludable or nonoptional) goods do 
11 Andrea Sangiovanni, “Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the 
State,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (2007), 3-39. 
12 Cited from Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 90. (Nozick does 
not endorse the principle.) 
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not coincide with state boundaries.  (A good is nonexcludable with 
respect to a group just in case none can be excluded from 
consuming it, and nonoptional just in case all must consume some if 
anyone consumes any.) For basic physical security I depend mostly 
on my neighbors, then on others in widening concentric circles. 
Living in San Diego, I depend on the law abidingness of people in 
the nearby country of Mexico but not at all on the law abidingness 
of remote fellow countrymen in Maine or Kentucky. Same goes for 
other types of important public goods. So the view would fail even 
if it were otherwise impeccable. But it has further defects. 
The idea that a higher level of obligation across the board is 
owed to people who are involved in cooperating that supplies you 
basic public goods is implausible on its face. After all, the most 
necessary public goods involve basic physical security that is 
established when others are not a menace threatening physical 
harm. But people are just required by morality to refrain from being 
such a menace to others. Conforming to this elementary moral 
requirement does not somehow generate huge social justice 
entitlements. If you imagine making the reciprocity social justice 
proposal in the first person, it sounds decidedly odd: “Along with 
others, I refrain from assaulting and marauding, so I am on this 
basis entitled to special justice consideration from all those I might 
attack, but do not.” This is not a likely first step of an argument 
that is eventually supposed to show that we have moral duties to 
put the interests of our fellow compatriots higher in the queue for 
consideration than the greater interests and needs of outsiders.  
The provision of basic physical security partly involves people 
refraining from wrongful predation against others and partly 
involves people cooperating with others to provide protection 
against those who are wrongfully inclined to predation. Consider 
the latter. Here I can discern a plausible duty of reciprocity—if 
others pay for their fair share of the cost of protective services, I 
should do the same.13 There is room for dispute as to what 
constitutes a fair share of the costs of these enterprises. But I do 
not see here the base for an across the board requirement of social 
justice to give special priority to advancing the interests of co-
13 I defend the principle of fairness against recent influential 
criticisms in my “Paternalism and the Principle of Fairness,” in 
Christian Coons and Michael Weber, eds., Paternalism: Theory and 
Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 134-156. 
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national fellow cooperators.  After all, purchasing resources from 
those who charge a fair price does not trigger a broad social justice 
community involving strong requirements to favor fellow 
community members over outsiders. 
Another flaw in the proposal that obligations generated by the 
Hart-Rawls principle of fairness trigger special a special standing 
duty of egalitarian justice that holds just among the members of 
each particular nation-state is that the degree to which persons 
cooperate to produce important public goods such as the rule of 
law that are arguably necessary for each person in a nation state to 
have the opportunity to lead a tolerably good life is highly variable 
across persons. Some persons are extremely cooperative, some 
moderately cooperative, some barely cooperative, some are 
downright uncooperative. It would seem that if I owe a duty of 
reciprocity to fellow members of my nation state that shapes what 
I owe to each of them by way of justice, what I we depends in part 
on how cooperatively each one behaves.  How are we supposed to 
get an egalitarian requirement to bring about the same favorable 
condition for everybody from a factor that is distributed very 
unequally across persons—their sociability and cooperative public-
spirited virtue. Or we can put this point the other way round: 
insofar as we do feel that we owe the conditions of the rule of law 
to all the members of the society we inhabit, even if they are 
uncooperative scofflaws, the basis of this obligation cannot be 
entirely a duty of reciprocity to return good for good and evil for 
evil. 
I do not deny that people can acquire duties of fair play 
according to the Hart-Rawls principle of fairness. Just suppose I 
am wrong to deny that the crucially important goods that enable 
people to have decent lives are secured for people for the most part 
via country by country cooperation.  This would mean that in each 
country people have special duties of reciprocity to their fellow 
cooperators within that country. These duties require recipients of 
these cooperative benefits to contribute fairly to the cost of their 
provision. Just suppose this is true. What would follow regarding 
the morality of patriotism and partiality to conationals? 
Not much, is the answer. First, as already mentioned, the duties 
that are generated hold only among fellow cooperators, not across 
entire national populations (including cooperators and 
noncooperators). Second, as already mentioned, the duties are not 
across the board duties to favor fellow cooperators over other 
people. The duties are specific duties to repay specific debts. 
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Analogy: my duty to pay retailers for the services they provide me 
via market trading does not generate an across the board duty on 
my part to favor the interests of retailers over other people. Third, 
the duties of reciprocity generated by within-country cooperative 
networks does not begin to establish any duty to promote the 
national project or other nationalist aims. Even if Germans owe 
fellow Germans a duty of reciprocity in light of their fellows’ 
cooperation to provide the rule of law in Germany, this provides 
no platform for launching a duty incumbent on Germans to 
promote the flourishing of the German nation state or its grater 
comparative flourishing than is achieved by other nation states. In 
short: there is no sound deductive route from the Hart-Rawls 
principle of fairness to national partiality. 
A further wedge driving apart duties arising under Hart-Rawls 
and national partiality is that even if within-country cooperative 
provision of public goods occurs, so does across-country 
cooperation. So we may get nested sets of obligations, not one big 
within-country web repeated within different national borders 
across the globe. For example, consider the great increase in 
security against death and destruction by war that cooperation 
among nations in the aftermath of World War II has produced for 
people around the world. People who have lived in this 70 year 
period in each one of such disparate nations as the U.S. North 
Korea, France, the former U.S.S.R, and China owe a lot to the fact 
that people in the other nations have by and large refrained from 
warmongering and supporting politicians who would pursue war 
and international aggression. Mutual nuclear deterrence arises from 
various causes, but it can be viewed as in part the outcome of wide-
scale cooperation across nations. 
Moreover, nothing in the statement of Hart-Rawls and its 
application to cooperation within each set of national borders rules 
out the possibility that the duty to promote and support just 
governments and social structures very largely derives from a 
natural moral duty to promote and support justice. This has the 
shape and structure of a beneficence duty, except that its object is 
justice anywhere and everywhere. The duty might be a duty to 
support and respect just arrangements, with the requirement of 
support including a duty to respect and obey just arrangements 
when they are already in place. The duty might be limited in its 
demands, and must be understood as leaving each of us large 
freedom to live her life as she chooses, and might also allow 
discretion as to where and how one acts for justice, but nonetheless 
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be a strict duty that makes it mandatory not optional to work for 
justice up to some limit of cost or risk to oneself.   
My duty to support and promote justice so understood is not a 
duty limited in scope by time or space. If I can promote justice in 
distant lands, I have as weighty a duty to do that as to assist local 
justice promotion, and if I can more effectively and at lower cost 
act to promote justice in distant lands than nearby, my duty to 
promote and support justice generates duties to act in justice 
promoting ways that help distant strangers might well take priority 
over local justice demands. Furthermore, these natural duty 
requirements might take priority over duties arising from duties 
arising from cooperative schemes via Hart-Rawls. Analogy: If I am 
morally required to fight in a foreign war for justice (e.g., joining a 
volunteer brigade to fight against Franco) next week, I am not 
allowed to establish a friendship here at home this week that 
triggers special friendship duties, and then say I am excused from 
my world justice obligation by the demands of my local friendship 
obligations. 
The claim that we are all under natural moral duties to promote 
and support justice is very plausible. The claim that this natural duty 
takes a gerrymandered form and gives rise to duties specially to the 
people living within the national borders of the land I happen to 
inhabit is implausible. Sometimes I may be more able to act 
effectively to promote justice locally than faraway, but that is an 
empirical contingency that might or might not obtain. 
In short, the claim that our fundamental justice duties arise 
from reciprocity obligations stemming from cooperative networks 
within national borders, so our fundamental justice obligations are 
owed to insiders (fellow countrymen) not outsiders, merits 
rejection. First, the plausible cooperative networks answering to 
this description spill across national borders and do not establish 
special duties owed only to fellow countrymen. Second, these 
reciprocity duties anyway do not have a shape that fits with the duty 
of national partiality urged by advocates of patriotism. Third, 
anyway Hart-Rawls is (I submit) subsumed in a larger set of justice 
obligations in which a natural moral duty to promote and support 
justice has pride of place. And this natural moral duty is not shaped 
by national borders. Its natural shape is extreme cosmopolitan. 
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5. Summary 
Even if you agree with all the arguments advanced in this essay, 
they do not add up to a positive case for cosmopolitanism. I have 
simply considered several prominent lines of thought that have 
been offered to support national partiality and found all of them 
unsatisfactory. The list of arguments considered does not amount 
to a systematic survey of all possible justifications. The arguments 
considered that favor national partiality are a motley bunch. So 
nothing asserted in this essay rules out the possibility that 
tomorrow you or someone else will formulate the decisive and 
compelling rationale for holding that each of us has strong duties 
of partiality to favor the flourishing of our own nation and its 
members. The fact that there are a number of bad arguments for a 
claim does not show or even tend to show that the claim is false. 
Nonetheless, I hope to have aroused your critical suspicions. 
Suppose we start with a commonsense conviction such as the 
morality of patriotism, work to explain and justify this claim, and 
after repeated efforts come up empty pockets. At some point we 
should entertain seriously the view that the basic reason we are 
failing to find good arguments for the truth of our conviction is 
that there exist no such good arguments because the conviction is 
false. Patriotism is perhaps immoral. 
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